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INTRODUCTION
The present article cannot give an entirelycomprehensive view of the topics which itconsiders, and will necessarily restrict itself to a
treatment of their salient features. At present, there is no
Commission proposal aiming at the harmonisation of the
law concerning minority protection in public companies,
although such protection has apparently frequently been
the topic of books, articles and postgraduate theses in
different jurisdictions. Although the Commission’s recent
Communication on Modernising Company Law mentions
the need for shareholder democracy, it does not contain
any definite new proposals concering minority protection.
THE POSITION IN FRANCE
Minority rights and general meetings
Meetings of French societés anonymes (SAs or public
companies) may be convened by the board of directors, or
the supervisory board. If the directors or supervisory
board fail to call a meeting, it may be called by the
statutory auditors, or the liquidators if the company is in
liquidation. Furthermore, in case of urgency any interested
party or one or more shareholders holding at least one-
tenth of the company’s issued capital may apply to the
President of the Commercial Court to appoint a special
representative who is empowered to call a meeting
(Commercial Code, Article L225–103).
The person calling the meeting is responsible for fixing
its agenda (Article L225–105, ibid). However, shareholders
holding at least 5% of the issued capital are empowered by
Article L225–105(2) of the Commercial Code to require
resolutions prepared by them to be placed on the agenda
of a meeting. Article 128 of Decree No. 67–236 of 23
March 1967, as amended, contains special rules governing
the required holdings when the company’s capital exceeds
certain amounts.
Minority rights in other situations
The types of shareholders’ rights
Shareholders, acting individually or collectively, may
exercise certain rights which are not immediately
associated with general meetings. Certain of these rights
may be exercised by individual shareholders, whilst others
may only be exercised by a shareholder or shareholders
possessing 10% or more of the company’s capital.
Furthermore, certain special rules govern the minimum
percentage of shareholders who can require (if the articles
so provide) that certain actions may be taken in the event
of failure to disclose relevant changes in the accounts of
shares held by another shareholder or shareholders in
conformity with the provisions of the company’s articles
(see Article L233–7, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Commercial Code). The relevant percentage of
shareholder(s) consists of one or more persons holding a
fraction of the capital or voting rights in the company at
least equal to the smallest fraction of capital which must be
declared according to the articles (as opposed to the legal
rules set out in Article L233–7, paragraph 1). This amount
may not exceed 5% of the capital. The holders of such an
amount of the company’s capital, or of a larger one may
require that any shareholder who has failed to fulfil his
obligation of disclosure shall be deprived of his excess
voting rights for two years after the regularisation of the
position (Article L233–7, paragraph 6).
However, when a company is listed, individual
shareholders the Stock Exchange Commission and the
public prosecutor have the right to request the
Commercial Court that any shareholder who has failed to
disclose its shareholdings shall lose all or part of his voting
rights for a period not exceeding five years. This rule is
quite independent of anything expressed in the company’s
articles (Article L233-14, paragraph 4).
Other rights of an individual nature
Shareholders in French public companies have
significant individual rights to obtain access to certain
documents and information associated with the general
meetings held during the last three financial years. These
rights may be exercised at any time and are granted by
Articles L225–115 to L225–117 at the Commercial Code
(see Le Gall, French Company Law, 2nd ed, Longmans,
1992, pp.143–44). They may also be exercised by the joint
owners or persons having a usufruct over shares (Article
L215–118).
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The relevant documents include the inventory, the
annual financial statements, consolidated accounts (if any),
a list of the existing directors or members of the
supervisory and executive boards, as well as that of the
statutory auditors (Commissaires aux comptes) (Article
L225–115, Nos 1 and 2). Information must also be made
available concerning candidates for election to the board or
boards of the company, and individual shareholders are also
entitled to particulars of resolutions proposed at meeting
together with the attendance sheets (Article L225–115,
No. 3 and Article L225–116). Furthermore, individual
shareholders are entitled to a statement, certified by the
statutory auditors, of the total amount of remuneration
paid to the five highest paid employees if the company has
no more than 200 employees, and to the 10 highest paid
employees if the number of employees exceeds 200
(Article L225–115, No. 4). Particulars, certified by the
statutory auditors, must be given of taxable amounts
earned by the company, and of registered shares held by
nominees (Article L225–115, No. 5). Individual
shareholders are also entitled to see the minutes of
shareholders’ meetings held during the last three financial
years (Article L225–117). The above rights appear very
extensive, but the extent to which they are exercised in
practice obviously depends on the degree of sophistication
of the shareholders and the extent to which they are
conscious of their rights.
Individual shareholders are able to bring derivative
actions in the name of the public company against its
directors or the members of its executive or supervisory
boards in respect of damage suffered by it (Article
L225–252). They may also bring a direct action against the
company, its directors, majority shareholders or statutory
auditors if they believe they have suffered personal damages
which is different from that suffered by the company. Such
actions may be based upon the general provisions of Article
1382 of the Civil Code concerning torts (delicts).
Procedures which allow several shareholders to appoint
one or more common representatives from amongst
themselves to commence an action in their name are
available both in the case of personal and derivative actions
(Decree No. 67–236 of 23 July 1967, Articles 199 and 200).
Where derivative suits are concerned, the procedure is
only available to the holders of at least the same percentage
of the company’s capital which is empowered to propose
resolutions at shareholders’ meetings (Article 200, ibid).
The introduction of some kind of statutory derivative
action may eventually take place in the United Kingdom as
was suggested by the Law Commission in its 1997 paper,
Shareholder Remedies (Com 3769) it was intended that the
new procedure would replace the existing common law
one. The Law Commission’s proposal regarding the
ratification of breaches of their duties by the directors has
received some criticism. There is no remedy available to
minority shareholders in France or other civil law countries
corresponding to that granted under sections 459–461 of
the Companies Act 1985. As in the United Kingdom (No.
00596 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 133) where the normal
operation of the company is prevented by serious
difficulties, the court may appoint a temporary manager on
the petition of an individual shareholder. Such a person is
called a receiver in the United Kingdom. In both this
country and France, the relevant remedy is not readily
granted.
Rights of shareholders holding at least 10% of the
share capital
As in Germany, French shareholders individually or
collectively holding at least 10% of share capital of a public
company have certain rights. These rights less frequently
consist of the ability to successfully object to a particular
measure than is the case in Germany. However, a minority
consist of the holders of more than one third of the votes
present or represented can block an extraordinary resolution
(Commercial Code, Article L225–96, paragraph. 113).
The minority of shareholders mentioned at the
beginning of the above paragraph is empowered by Article
L235–232 to submit written questions twice a year to the
chairman of the managing or executive board concerning
any matter which might compromise the continuance of
the company’s operations. The response to these questions
must be given within a period of one month and be
communicated to the statutory auditors. The same
minority also has the important power granted them by
Article L235–231 of petitioning the court requiring it to
appoint one or more experts charged with the task of
reporting on one or more management decisions. The
relevant minority of shareholders share this power with the
works committee (comité d’enterprise), the Stock Exchange
Commission (Commission des Operations de Bourse) in the case
of listed companies, and the public prosecutors). The
present power has been made much use of in practice, and
there are a number of relevant court decisions concerning
its exercise. The Commission’s recent Communication on
Modernising Company Law mentions the proposal of the
High Level Group that shareholders in EC public
companies having a specified percentage of the share
capital should have the right to request a special
investigation.
By Article L225–230, one or more shareholders
representing at least one tenth of the company’s capital
may object to the appointment of statutory auditors by the
general meeting. According to Article 188 of Decree No.
67–236 of 23 July 1967, such an objection must be made
within 30 days of the appointment of such auditors. Article
L225–233 empowers the same majority of shareholders, as
well as the managing or executive board and the works
committee, to request the Commercial Court to dismiss
any statutory auditor who does not perform his tasks
adequately, or who is prevented from fulfilling them by
reasons of illness or any other cause. Finally, when the
public company is controlled by another undertaking18
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which includes it in the consolidated accounts, thereby
making it exempt from the preparation of such accounts,
the stipulated majority of shareholders is enabled by Article
L233–17 to deny it the possibility of such an exemption.
THE POSITION IN GERMANY
Minority rights are generally treated under German law
as belonging to the holders of a specific percentage of the
share capital. However it may be noted that individual
shareholders in a Germany public company
(Aktiengesellschaft) are given the right to such information as
they require to properly evaluate agenda item (paragraph
131, German Aktiengesetz). This right may only be denied
them in certain specified circumstances, for example
where its exercise would cause material damage to the
company. The court may decide whether such information
must be provided (paragraph 132, German Aktiengesetz).
Minority protection and general meetings
The holders of 5% of a public company’s share capital
may request the calling of a special shareholders’ meeting
in writing stating its purpose and the reason for it
(paragraph 122(1), AktG). Shareholders holding 5% of the
share capital or an amount equivalent (the German text
uses the phrase anteiligen Betrag which means proportionate
amount: this wording appears to take account of no par
value shares (Stückaktien)) to 500,000 euros may require
the inclusion of a specific item on the agenda (paragraph
122(2) AktG). If the management board fails to comply
with one of the requests mentioned in the present
paragraph, the court may authorise the relevant
shareholders to call a meeting or to publish the relevant
items (paragraph 123(3) AktG).
Minority rights in other situations
The rules of German law are somewhat detailed and
have undergone some amendments to recent years. Certain
rights are given to a minority holding 5% of the company’s
capital or an amount thereof equivalent to 500,000 euros:
these include the right to petition the court in particular
circumstances, for example under paragraphs 254(2)
(actions to set aside a resolution on the appropriation of
distributable profits), 258(2) (appointment of special
auditors by reason of material undervaluations in the
accounts) and 265(3) AktG (appointment or removal of
liquidators)
A 10% minority is empowered to prevent a waiver or
compromise at various claims which a company may have
against members of the boards of the company or other
persons, for example those who exert an influence on the
company contrary to the requirements of paragraph
117(1) AktG. The relevant legal provisions are set out in
paragraphs 50, 53, 93(4), 116 and 117(4) AktG. Thus, as
a further example, paragraph 50 AktG provides that claims
against the founders of the company and the boards
thereof in respect of the incorporation of the company may
only be waived or compromised if the shareholders’
meeting so consents and no minority whose aggregate
holding is equal to or exceeds 10% of the share capital
records an objection in the minutes.
The same 10% minority (which must in these cases
consist of shareholders represented at the passing of the
resolution) may also block a waiver or settlement of claims
which a controlled company has against the controlling one
(see paragraphs 309(3), 310(4), 317(4), 318(4) and
323(1) AktG). The latter rules are applicable to
contractual groups de facto groups and integrated ones.
According to paragraph 147(1) AktG, a 10% minority that
has held its shares for at least three months prior to the
relevant meeting may require the enforcement of claims by
the company for compensation for damages which have
arisen in connection with the formation or management of
the company, or in respect of the improper use of influence
on it. Any such claim must be brought within six months
of the date of the meeting when the request was made. A
recent change in the law, which should enhance the
position of the minority, has made it possible for the court
to appoint special representatives upon the motion of
shareholders whose total shareholdings exceeds 5% of the
share capital, or an amount thereof equivalent to 500,000
euros. The court may so act if there are facts which justify
the serious suspicion that the company suffered a loss
through dishonest conduct, or a gross violation of the law
or the articles. The court appointed representatives may
assert the claim for compensation in appropriate
circumstances (paragraph 147(3) AktG).
A minority holding 10% or more of the share capital or
an amount equivalent to one million euros may petition the
court for the appointment of a special auditor when the
shareholders’ meeting has failed to make such an
appointment. Facts must exist which give rise to the
suspicion that improprieties or serious breaches of the law
have occurred in connection with any matter relating to
the formation of the company or the management of its
business during the past five years (paragraph 143(2)
AktG). A similar minority may require separate resolutions
to be passed on certain or all the members of the boards
concerning their discharge from responsibility (paragraph
120(1) AktG). The latter minority is also entitled to make
application to the court for the dismissal of members of the
supervisory board who have been appointed by certain
shareholders, when there is good reason for s doing
(paragraph 103(2) AktG).
The holders of more than 25% of the share capital of a
public company are sometimes referred to as a blacking
minority (Schachtelminorität), because they are able to block
those company resolutions which have to be passed by a
75% majority, e.g. resolutions for the alteration of the
articles. However, some commentators protest that such
shareholders should not be treated as having a minority
right. 19
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
There does not seem to be very much in common
between the relevant rules of French and German law
except, to some extent insofar as they concern the calling
of meetings, and derivative actions. Thus German law does
not contain any provisions permitting a minority to object
to the appointment of auditors, or to request the court to
deprive shareholders who have been guilty of non-
disclosure of their holdings, of their voting rights. Despite
the provisions of paragraphs 131 and 132 AktG, German
shareholders in public companies do not appear to enjoy
the extensive rights to information and documents enjoyed
by their French counterparts. Shareholders in French
public companies which are listed have still more extensive
rights.
If the draft Fifth Directive on Employee Participation
and Company Structure had been enacted, this would have
resulted in the establishment of common rules for
derivative actions in the EC Member States (see Articles 14
and 16 of the 1972 proposal). Such a development now
seems unlikely, as owing to political opposition, work on
the draft Fifth Directive has now been abandoned. This
development should not deter the enactment of substantive
rules governing the derivative action in states in which such
rules do not exist. Such rules should, it is submitted be
applicable to certain situations where directors have been
negligent, as well as to breaches of their statutory and other
duties.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the doctrine of uti possidetis finds its originsin the jus civile of Roman law, it was transposed intointernational law to facilitate the creation of new
states during the decolonisation of Latin America and
subsequently Africa. In its modern form the doctrine
provides ‘that new States will come to independence with
the same boundaries they had when they were
administrative units within the territory or territories of a
colonial power’ (Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The
Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, 67 BYIL, 1996, 76,
97). For present purposes, the utility of uti possidetis lies in
the fact that it provides an excellent illustration of the
tension existing within modern international law between
the evolution of the right to self-determination and the
entitlement of states to protect their territorial integrity
and retain exclusive jurisdiction in domestic matters.
By way of introduction, the article will briefly discuss the
right to self-determination and the problems it poses for
the international state system. Against the backdrop of
African decolonisation it will then examine the
ramifications of uti possidetis for self-determination in an
attempt to decipher the key priorities of the current
international system. Finally, the article will seek to assess
the validity of the recent extension of uti possidetis to non-
colonial situations and the resonance of this development
for modern international law in general.
1. Self-determination and existing territorial
regimes
One theory of self-determination considers the state to
be merely the political manifestation of its constituent
nation (or people). This interpretation allows a nation to
recreate its political form in the light of national
developments to ensure that the political unit (the State)
and the nation remain congruent. Underpinning this
approach is the claim that a nation or people of a given
territory have the right to decide the nature and form of
their own political identity. However in practice the
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